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ABSTRACT
In recent years, members of established political parties have received increased 
powers to select candidates and leaders. Several explanations have been advanced to 
account for this trend, focusing on the evolution of the political system, the charac-
teristics of party systems or intra-party dynamics. The aim of this article is to exam-
ine the introduction of democratising reforms for leadership selection in Portuguese 
parties. Despite the high degree of centralisation and the low levels of internal 
participation, all governing parties have expanded members’ rights during the last 
decade. The main findings suggest that party leaders have decided to change meth-
ods for leadership selection mainly for instrumental purposes in order to consolidate 
their internal power or gain electoral benefits. Moreover, this organisational trans-
formation has had reduced effects on the internal party functioning. Regardless of 
these similarities, the data show that there are important differences between parties 
with regard to levels of participation and internal competition.
INTRODUCTION
Political parties in contemporary democracies have experienced important 
organisational changes in recent decades, notably towards internal democ-
ratisation (Bille 2001; Kittilson and Scarrow 2003). While leaders’ election by 
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party congress or by party national bodies continues to be the rule in most 
established democracies, in many European countries political elites have 
decided to change the internal rules for leadership selection. 
The empowerment of party members for the selection of party leader-
ship has not only occurred in northern countries – for example in Denmark, 
Finland, Belgium or Ireland – but it has recently been expanded also to south-
ern Europe (Kenig 2009; Wauters 2010). Although the traditional indirect 
method of leadership selection is still clearly predominant, south European 
parties have recently undergone significant changes, especially in Greece 
(PASOK – Panhellenic  Socialist Movement), Italy (Democrats of the Left – DS, 
now the Democratic Party) and Portugal (Bosco and Morlino 2007). 
The Portuguese case deserves particular attention, as all major parties 
have decided to adopt this form of selection during the last decade. The 
Socialist Party (PS – Partido Socialista) was the first to introduce the direct 
election of party leaders in 1998. This organisational change was to remain 
an exception until the two parties of the right – the Social Democrats (PSD – 
Partido Social Democrata) and the Social and Democratic Centre-Popular 
Party (CDS-PP – Centro Democrático e Social-Partido Popular) – recently 
decided to introduce the selection of party leadership by individual 
members.
This evolution appears quite surprising, as Portuguese parties have 
been characterised by a high degree of centralisation, especially with 
regard to the selection of party candidates and leaders and the elaboration 
of policy orientations (Freire 2001; Lobo 2003). 
If we consider the inclusiveness versus exclusiveness continuum 
adopted by Rahat and Hazan (2001) to gauge the democratic character of 
party functioning, all governing parties display a low level of intra-party 
democracy, members’ participation and openness of internal decision-
making mechanisms. Overall, the main Portuguese political parties can be 
considered essentially as ‘electoralist parties’, characterised by the concen-
tration of power in party executives, while party leaders have maintained 
a large degree of autonomy (Magone 2004; Jalali 2007). The increasing 
governmentalisation of the main parties and their entrenchment in the 
state have further enhanced the marginalisation of party members and the 
distance between grassroots and party elites (Lobo 2003; Lopes 2005). In this 
sense, it is even more puzzling that the adoption of every-member voting 
for leadership selection has taken place in a context of highly centralised 
political parties, low levels of intra-party democracy and an overwhelming 
elite control over party politics.
In this article, I analyse three specific cases of leadership selection expe-
rienced in Portugal during the last decade. While in the PS the democ-
ratisation of party leadership selection has been in place for quite a long 
period, in the case of the two parties of the right – PSD and CDS-PP – the 
change is very recent. The comparison between these experiences can shed 
more light on both the causes and consequences of the democratisation of 
leader selection, and on important aspects of party organisational change. 
This is even more valuable in the Portuguese case, as political parties have 
been resistant to transformations in party structures and internal function-
ing. Drawing on the democratising reforms undertaken in many political 
parties for leadership selection, the following section will point out some 
interpretations about the factors leading to the adoption of every-member 
voting. The third part will examine the Portuguese case, highlighting the 
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differences and similarities between the right and the socialist experiences. 
In the subsequent section, I will consider some of the consequences of 
these reforms in the three parties, while in the conclusions I will discuss 
the main findings in comparison with similar cases across Western Europe, 
emphasising the contribution of this research to the study of contemporary 
political parties.
THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS FOR THE DEMOCRATISATION OF PARTY 
LEADERSHIP SELECTION
The literature on political parties offers several interpretations about the 
adoption of democratising reforms for leadership selection. Generally, party 
organisational change can stem from both endogenous and exogenous factors 
(Panebianco 1988; Harmel and Janda 1994). While the characteristics of the 
political system and the evolution of party systems may influence the rules 
for the selection of party leaders, party organisations usually enjoy a certain 
amount of autonomy and constitute an arena for struggle, especially in terms 
of decision-making powers. This means that the introduction of democratis-
ing reforms can be the consequence of different elements and a combination 
of both internal and external dynamics. Drawing on party literature, as well as 
on the experience undergone by West European parties, it is possible to point 
out several rationales for interpreting party primaries (Table 1). As Barnea and 
Hazan (2007) have noted, the different explanations for intra-party reforms 
can be distinguished between the political system level, the party system level 
and the party organisation level.  
There are three distinct arguments related to the evolution of the political 
system with regard to the expansion of members’ rights for leadership selec-
tion. These theories focus mainly on long-term transformations, such as the 
growing lack of legitimacy of political parties, the presidentialisation of politics 
and the increasing cognitive mobilisation of party members and voters. The 
fourth and fifth rationales are based on party system characteristics and inter-
party competition, while the ‘cartel party’ thesis is built on both external and 
internal arguments. Finally, there are also arguments that apply essentially to 
the internal functioning of political parties. 
These alternative explanations of the adoption of democratising reforms 
are not, of course, mutually exclusive. In most cases, more than one argument 
is needed to interpret and understand why parties have decided to shift new 
powers to members. 
The first interpretation of the adoption of the membership vote for choos-
ing party leaders refers to the functional and organisational crisis of political 
parties in contemporary democratic polities. Several authors have argued that 
political parties have lost the capacity to attract party members and to foster 
grassroots mobilisation, failing to perform some of their traditional functions, 
such as promoting participation and articulating demands from civil society 
(Bartolini and Mair 2001; Schmitter 2001). 
According to Ignazi et al. (2005), as parties have lost their capacity to 
distribute ideological incentives and have increasing difficulty retaining 
members’ support through material benefits, they prefer to introduce proce-
dural incentives in order to stimulate membership participation and to enhance 
party cohesion. Thus, every-member voting is seen as a necessary instrument 
to strengthen the linkage between parties and civil society, especially with 
a growing dissatisfaction – if not hostility – towards party organisations. To 
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recover the crisis of political parties in contemporary society, which can to 
a great extent be interpreted as a crisis of their image within public opinion 
(Dalton and Weldon 2005), parties may consider the adoption of leadership 
selection reforms as a means to regenerate their legitimacy and their confi-
dence among citizens. 
This interpretation is also linked to another important transformation of 
political parties at the system level: that is, the empowerment of leaders within 
party organisations. Overall, varied reasons can account for this phenomenon: 
the transformations of mass political communication – especially in regard to 
campaign politics – the presidentialisation of executives and, last but not least, 
the weakening anchorage of party organisations (Poguntke and Webb 2005). 
In this sense, the democratisation of leadership’s selection mirrors the internal 
distribution of power and the increasing personalisation of political parties. 
With a growing concentration of powers in the leaders’ hands, party members 
become directly responsible for leadership choice. 
According to some scholars, this trend can also be interpreted as a proc-
ess of the ‘Americanisation’ of political parties in Western European democ-
racies (Young and Cross 2002; Barnea and Hazan 2007). Yet, the process of 
Arena/Level of 
analysis
Approach Rationale Main potential effects
Political system Party crisis Increase legitimacy 
Introduction of collec-
tive incentives
Increasing satisfaction with 
political parties (and democ-
racy)
Increasing participation
Presidentialisation Personalisation of 
party leadership
Leader-oriented campaigns
Cognitive 
mobilisation
Intra-party democracy Empowerment of party 
members
Party system Responsiveness Redefine party policy 
vis-à-vis voters and 
members
Policy and programmatic 
change
Party competition Increase party 
performance
Change of electoral strategy
Electoral success
Party 
organisation
Cartel party More autonomy for 
leadership’s negotia-
tion
Neutralisation of 
middle-rank activists
Centralisation
Demobilisation
Party fragmentation Increase cohesion
Avoid or limit party 
conflicts and splits
Struggle for power 
among party leaders
Centralisation or increasing 
intra-party competition
Conflicts over internal rules
Table 1: Approaches for analysing party leadership democratisation.
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democratisation may also play an important role in new democracies where 
party leaders displayed great prominence during the democratic transition 
(Van Biezen 2003).
Another important reason associated with the evolution of the political 
system focuses on the changing characteristics of party members and the 
electorate. During past decades citizens have acquired new competences, 
have increased their knowledge and have become less attached to political 
parties. According to several authors, they have also changed their attitudes, 
not only by displaying more criticism towards parties (Norris 1999; Dalton 
2004), but also by supporting more direct forms of political participation in 
order to influence policy outcomes. This process has created favourable 
conditions for opening up party organisation and for the empowerment of 
party members. As a consequence, a growing normative concern related to 
members’ participation and the transparency of internal party functioning has 
emerged in most contemporary societies (Harmel and Janda 1994; Kitschelt 
2006; Valbruzzi 2005). This rationale is also linked to social capital theories, 
which stress the importance of high levels of mobilisation for increasing the 
quality of democracy. 
The fourth and fifth arguments refer mainly to the party system level. 
Some authors have found that one of the main reasons to adopt direct lead-
ership selection is the lack of representativeness of the party elites, espe-
cially the party in public office (Cross and Crysler 2009). From this point 
of view, the direct election of party leaders has two main objectives. On 
the one hand, it may make government action more cohesive and effi-
cient, contributing to maximise the implementation of policies according 
to the party mandate: as several authors have noted (Hopkin 2001; Rahat 
2008), this process can prompt a retrospective responsiveness, when party 
members are so dissatisfied with their leaders they decide to use their ‘voice’ 
in order to remove them from power. On the other hand, the direct partici-
pation of party members (and voters) may provide important feedback for 
party leaders that can increase the responsiveness of the party leadership 
and the congruence between the party action and voters’ preferences, thus 
fostering a prospective responsiveness (Maravall 2008). In this case, democ-
ratisation would lead to the choice of moderate candidates who have better 
chances to appeal to the average voter, thus rejecting radical leaders with 
less chance of winning office.
This argument is strictly linked to more ‘rational’ motivations of party 
leaders whose interest in adopting the direct election stems from the need to 
enhance party electoral appeal among voters. In this sense, the democratisa-
tion of leadership selection is seen as an electoral asset with the aim of maxim-
ising party support and consolidating the position of party leaders. According 
to this rationale, this change often takes place after a major electoral setback, 
leading the leadership to try to mobilise new voters and attract new members. 
In other words, when the party is in opposition and wants to (re)gain voters’ 
confidence and support, party leaders may decide to give the rank-and-file 
a greater say. Thus, the timing of the introduction of these organisational 
reforms is crucial in order to understand whether the motivations for reforms 
follow merely electoral considerations. In this sense, the change of leadership 
selection method is part of a strategic plan aiming at strengthening leaders’ 
image and party electoral performance. The Italian case can be considered 
an example of the strategic use of party primaries, especially with regard to 
the leader’s selection of the centre-left coalition for the 2006 election. The 
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campaign by Romano Prodi was the first step of his electoral strategy that 
sought to enhance his popularity and improve the coalition’s performance.
This example leads to the consideration of another aspect of the democra-
tisation of leadership selection, one that brings the importance of the internal 
party arena to the fore. This focuses on the need to reduce internal conflicts, 
as they can endanger the electoral performance and bar parties’ strategic 
and programmatic adaptation. The oft-used explanation for the expansion 
of democratisation reforms regarding leadership selection stems from Katz 
and Mair’s hypothesis about the strategic calculus of party elites in introduc-
ing internal reforms for party leaders’ selection (Katz and Mair 1995; Mair 
1997). According to this rationale, the adoption of the one-member-one-vote 
(OMOV) method is a way to reduce the power of party activists and middle-
rank members, while empowering individual participation and rights. By the 
same token, party leaders are easily able to control internal struggles and 
achieve stronger cohesion. The selection of party leadership would be just a 
way to legitimise the leader’s orientations and to attribute more freedom of 
manoeuvre in regard to strategic and programmatic action. The ‘cartel party’ 
thesis considers the expansion of intra-party democracy as a means to disem-
power party activists and facilitate accommodation between parties at the elite 
level (Katz and Mair 2009). According to this interpretation, democratising 
reforms are a consequence of both external and internal factors. On the one 
hand, party elites need to negotiate with other actors of the party systems and 
they have to protect their position; on the other, they need to limit internal 
conflicts. Thus, this theory aims to bridge the gap between externally-based 
motivation and internal constraints. 
This brief literature review would not be complete without taking into 
account an important aspect based on specific organisational dynamics. Party 
organisations can be seen as an arena of conflicts where the main actors 
contend for portions of power. As Panebianco (1988) stressed, democratis-
ing reforms are often an instrument through which challengers gain internal 
power and defeat the dominant coalition. From this perspective, while parties 
are usually seen as conservative organisations that tend to resist change, party 
leaders and factions play a crucial role in prompting organisational transfor-
mations (Wilson 1994). The dynamics and structure of intra-party bargain-
ing is influenced by internal party rules, and these represent the first element 
incumbent leaders need to control in order to achieve their objectives.  
Our argument is that the rationale for the adoption of democratising 
reforms in recent democracies is both an externally- and internally-driven 
process. On the one hand, party elites are pressured by electoral competition, 
and may use more inclusive leadership selection procedures to obtain benefits 
in the electoral arena; on the other, leaders can strengthen their position within 
the party by insulating themselves from critics or failures to achieve the main 
objectives. Both arguments are particularly important when we consider the 
role and the characteristics of political parties in the recent southern European 
democracies, where the electoral performance posits relevant constraints for 
party action and for regulating horizontal conflicts within the dominant coali-
tion. Thus, in order to interpret the rationale of democratising reforms for 
leaders’ selection, it is extremely important to investigate the ‘instrumentality’ 
of these changes, often used by party elites for their own desired outcome. In 
the sections that follow, I will explore this argument in regard to Portuguese 
political parties, underlining the marginal impact of these reforms in altering 
the main features of intra-party politics. 
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 1. The Communist Party 
is an exception to the 
main organisational 
characteristics shared 
by governing parties. 
In this case, the 
party leadership is 
selected by the Central 
Committee, which is 
the most important 
authority between 
congresses. This 
method has remained 
unchanged, although 
some critics have 
recently defended 
the introduction of 
democratising reforms. 
The Left Bloc (Bloco de 
Esquerda), a left-wing 
party formed in 1999, 
has adopted a more 
collegial leadership 
style.
 2. In many cases, 
members have to 
belong to the party 
for a certain length 
of time before being 
eligible to participate. 
Unlike what happens in 
some other European 
parties, in none of the 
Portuguese parties is a 
voting fee required in 
order to participate.
 3. See the motion 
advanced by Sampaio 
in the 1992 congress 
(Directas Já!). This 
proposal included 
the introduction of 
primaries for all public 
offices. See also Público 
5 May 2006.
THE INTRODUCTION OF DEMOCRATISING REFORMS FOR PARTY 
LEADERSHIP SELECTION IN PORTUGUESE POLITICAL PARTIES
Portuguese political parties have traditionally been characterised by a high 
level of centralisation, while leaders have displayed significant powers. To a 
large extent this is the consequence of being internally created parties with 
important organisational resources in the hands of the main leaders. They 
usually control the extra-parliamentary party – which is the most impor-
tant face of party organisations – as the party in central office overshadows 
the legislative party (Van Biezen 2003). Party leaders also benefit from the 
fact that, with few exceptions, prime ministers have always been the effec-
tive leaders of their respective parties. Although formally selected by (and 
accountable to) party congresses, party leaders have a significant degree of 
autonomy in terms of intra-party dynamics, while cases of competition for 
party leadership were rare, especially when parties hold government posi-
tions. Mário Soares, the historic leader of the PS (1974–1986), and Freitas do 
Amaral, the CDS leader (1974–1982), dominated the internal party life of their 
respective parties, displaying very stable leaderships. While the leading role 
of party chair in the PS and in the CDS is evident, in the PSD party lead-
ers have essentially been managers rather than uncontested decision-makers. 
However, during the PSD majority governments (1987–1995), Cavaco Silva 
was able to control the extra-parliamentary party from the executive, reducing 
the centrifugal tendencies (Lobo 2005).
One of the most important organisational transformations undergone by 
Portuguese political parties during the last decade relates to the adoption of 
party leader elections by party members. The PS was the first to introduce 
democratisation reforms in the late 1990s, while the two parties of the right 
adopted direct leadership selection only recently, between 2005 and 2006.1 In 
all these parties participation in the selection of the party leadership is limited 
to party members.2 In both the socialist and the parties of the right, the reform 
of leadership selection method stemmed from the party leaders’ strategic 
calculation, which seeks to strengthen their position in the electoral arena or 
against internal opposition. The decision to adopt every-member voting was a 
conflictual issue in all parties. In this section, I will analyse how these parties 
undertook these reforms and the rationale behind these processes.
THE INTRODUCTION OF DIRECT LEADERSHIP SELECTION IN 
THE SOCIALIST PARTY
Although the introduction of direct leadership selection took place in 1998, 
the genesis of democratisation reforms in the PS dates back to the beginning 
of the 1990s. The background prompting the debate on leadership selection 
methods stemmed from the struggle for party leadership after Soares’s with-
drawal. The incumbent leader, Jorge Sampaio, proposed the adoption of every-
member voting when Guterres challenged his leadership in 1992.3 The latter, 
who was firmly against this proposal, was able to gain control over the party 
and implemented an organisational change that failed to strengthen internal 
participation and to enhance legitimisation (Van Biezen 2003; Lisi 2009). This 
radical transformation of the party organisation was based on the abolish-
ment of the congress and the introduction of a convention elected directly by 
party members. It was only after the success in the 1995 legislative elections 
that a favourable environment was mature enough for the adoption of direct 
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leadership elections. Guterres was thus the first Portuguese party leader ever 
to be chosen by an every-member voting mechanism.  
It is worth recalling the context in which the introduction of direct elec-
tion came about in order to understand the rationale behind it. The prime 
minister was in a very good situation following his government’s economic 
successes (entry in the European Monetary Union), the high degree of inter-
nal consensus through successful social policies (low rate of unemployment, 
introduction of a minimum wage) and also international prestige (organisa-
tion of Expo 1998) (Lobo and Magalhães 2004). In addition to these favour-
able external conditions, the socialist leader was experiencing a very positive 
moment with regard to the internal party life, as the party elite displayed a 
strong cohesion and fully supported the executive’s policies.
These factors represented favourable conditions for the adoption of 
direct leadership selection methods. First, the electoral success led to the 
neutralisation of internal tensions and the distribution of selective incen-
tives was widely used to control middle-rank elite and party activists. 
Second, access to power paved the way to the subordination of the extra-
parliamentary party to the party in government. Meetings of national party 
bodies and structures were increasingly sporadic, while the core executive 
deeply influenced the internal party life. Finally, Guterres decided to open 
up the leader’s election when another major restructure of the party organi-
sation took place. In 1998, the PS elite decided to restore the traditional 
party conventions and re-established the congress as the main delibera-
tive body. However, the hierarchical structure based on the representative 
principle was now combined with the introduction of the direct election 
for party leader, thus accepting the organisational change proposed by 
Sampaio. In this sense, this reform was a compromise between those lead-
ers defending a more conventional party structure, on the one hand, and 
those advocating the need to implement new linkages between party elites 
and members, on the other.
In this context, the first election for a leader of the party was a plebisci-
tary legitimisation of Guterres’ leadership. Official data reported a 65 per cent 
turnout, with Guterres receiving almost 97 per cent of the members’ votes 
(Table 2), and no other candidates contesting party leadership.
Despite the renewal of the socialist majority in 1999, the prime minis-
ter experienced increasing problems inside the government, deepening the 
tensions between the party in public office and the party in central office. This 
contributed towards demobilising party members, as is demonstrated by the 
fact that in the following direct election, which was held in 2001, the partici-
pation rate dropped to 43 per cent, although data on party members had not 
updated and must therefore be considered with caution. The fall in participa-
tion was probably also related to the lack of competition, as the party leader 
was the only candidate contesting the election.
Guterres resigned as prime minister after a governmental crisis prompted 
by defeat in the 2001 local elections. The socialists had to find a new leader 
to stand as candidate in the elections scheduled for March 2002. The way in 
which the new leader was selected reflects the limitations to the empower-
ment of party members within the PS. In fact, the main party leaders chose 
Ferro Rodrigues, a former minister in Guterres’s governments and one of 
his closest collaborators, as the candidate for the 2002 elections. The new 
leader was presented to the voters in January, although no competition 
took place. In this sense, the internal campaign was simply an instrument 
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 4. Paulo Penedos 
challenged for the 
leadership, receiving 
less than two per cent 
of the votes.
to enhance internal legitimacy through the ratification by party members 
of a choice previously made by the party elite. Moreover, the campaign for 
party leadership was used to attract media attention and to reach voters in 
an effort to improve the candidate’s image. Even had Ferro Rodrigues been 
one of the best-known socialist ministers and displayed a positive image to 
the electorate, the campaign for party leadership represented the first step 
of the electoral campaign, and it allowed the new leader to test the impact 
of his political message and to receive feedback from party supporters.
That this election was anything but competitive emerged for the request 
put forth by Ferro Rodrigues himself to call for a second election at the 13th 
congress, which took place in November 2002. On that occasion a challenger 
emerged, a middle-rank leader practically unknown by the majority of party 
members and the public.4 The result was not very different from the previous 
one, with the incumbent receiving more than 96 per cent of the votes, while 
the electoral turnout remained very low (at approximately 15 per cent). Thus, 
as with the previous leadership elections, members did not have any real 
alternative beyond the incumbent leader. The plebiscitary elections served 
simply to confirm the choice made by the party elite and to project an image 
of internal unity that could influence public opinion positively.
Ferro Rodrigues had difficulty consolidating his leadership, both because 
the party was in opposition and because several top leaders became involved 
in a scandal relating to allegations of child abuse. He resigned during the politi-
cal crisis of 2004 – a crisis that stemmed from the resignation of Prime Minister 
Durão Barroso and the formation of a new government led by Santana Lopes – 
paving the way to a new competition for the party leadership. 
After more than two years in opposition and several events that upset the 
socialist elite, divisions within the party could no longer be ignored. Three 
candidates now stood for leadership of the party. The first was José Sócrates, 
Leader Year Number 
of voters
Turnout Votes
(%)
Voters as 
percentage 
of support-
ers in 
previous 
election
Competi-
tion
Institutional 
status
Guterres 1999  74,700 65 96.6  2.89 No Government
Guterres 2001  53,645 43 96.3  2.27 No Government
Ferro 
Rodrigues
2002 10–15,000
 approx.
15 96.4  0.50
approx.
No Opposition
Sócrates 2004  36,182 48 80.1  1.76 Yes Opposition
Sócrates 2006  25,709 27 97.2  1.00 No Government
Sócrates 2009  25,331 36 96.4  0.99 No Government
Average –  43,313 39 93.8  1.56 – –
Source: Party headquarters.
Table 2: The election of Socialist leaders.
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 5. This figure is much 
more reliable than 
the previous ones, as 
the enrolment files 
were updated during 
Ferro Rodrigues’s 
leadership and new 
rules were introduced 
that regulated party 
membership.
a former minister in Guterres’s governments and one of the most popular 
leaders. He was well-known among the public due to a television programme 
in which the future prime minister and PSD leader, Pedro Santana Lopes, 
also participated. Sócrates belonged to the moderate wing of the party and 
was a strong supporter of Guterres. The second candidate was Manuel Alegre, 
one of the PS’s founding leaders, who represented the left wing of the party. 
His was an unexpected candidacy, which emerged after the previous leader, 
Ferro Rodrigues, decided to endorse and support his own candidate. Finally, 
the third candidate was João Soares, Mário Soares’s son, who was consid-
ered an outsider, notwithstanding some important support from within the 
party elite. 
The three candidates were involved in a very competitive campaign 
in comparison to previous leadership contests. This competition caught 
members’ interest, and participation increased to 48 per cent.5 Participation 
by party members was enhanced both by the competition between the three 
candidates and by the political climate, which was characterised by increas-
ing discontent with the centre-right government, and with Santana Lopes in 
particular.
Sócrates was elected as the new party leader with a comfortable majority, 
gaining more than 80 per cent of the votes. Alegre only achieved 15 per cent, 
while Soares managed five per cent. Thus, the competition proved to be more 
formal than substantial, for with Sócrates there was a large consensus around 
the choice of new leader. Despite this, the direct election contributed towards 
improving the party’s image and communicating its policies and proposals to 
both members and voters. 
Following the PS’s victory in the 2005 legislative election, the new leader 
was able to improve his internal support and to further enhance party cohe-
sion. In this sense, the blurring of internal tendencies and the unanimity 
characterising the socialist elite during the first months of Sócrates’s leader-
ship led to the plebiscitary confirmation of the prime minister at the 2006 
party congress. Sócrates was re-elected without any internal opposition 
and in an election with a very low turnout (27 per cent of party members), 
obtaining more than 97 per cent of the votes cast – the highest percentage 
obtained by any socialist leader since the introduction of direct leadership 
election. Party members confirmed his leadership some months before the 
2009 elections in a campaign in which the prime minister was again the 
only candidate. This time he received more than 96 per cent of the vote in 
an election with the lowest participation rate in absolute terms. Overall, 
while in government, the direct election of PS leaders has assumed the 
character of plebiscitary elections, with no real competition and relatively 
low levels of participation.
TOO LATE OR TOO EARLY? THE EXPERIENCE OF THE PARTIES OF 
THE RIGHT
Unlike the PS, the right-wing parties have only recently introduced direct lead-
ership elections. Another remarkable difference between the socialists and the 
parties of the right is that neither the PSD nor the CDS-PP has experienced 
significant organisational changes. In both parties, the reform of leadership 
selection has its roots in internal party conflicts. As Panebianco (1988) pointed 
out, democratising reforms can often be interpreted as an instrument for chal-
lengers to stand against the dominant coalition and gain internal power. The 
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 6. Menezes was Secretary 
of State in Cavaco 
Silva’s government 
from 1991 to 1995 and 
has been mayor of Vila 
Nova de Gaia since 1998.
opposition status has accelerated centrifugal tendencies, as is shown by the 
fact that between 2005 and 2010 the new method of leader selection has been 
used on seven occasions. This section will examine the rationale underpinning 
the introduction of democratising reform, as well as the rules and practise of 
leadership election in right-wing parties.
The Social Democratic Party (PSD) 
Although the PSD decided to adopt every-member voting for leadership 
selection in 2006, the debate over this organisational change originated during 
the mid-1990s. The first proposal aiming at introducing direct election of party 
bodies was proposed in 1992 by Luis Filipe Menezes, a well-known leader 
with a strong base in the Oporto district.6 Yet, this proposal was unable to 
raise supporters within the party elite, and was immediately rejected by party 
leader and Prime Minister Cavaco Silva.
After defeat in the 1995 election, the internal dispute over party leadership 
caused deep conflicts between the main party factions to emerge (Frain 1998). 
Santana Lopes decided to oppose the incumbent leader (Marcelo Rebelo de 
Sousa) during the 19th congress in 1996. One of the main suggestions he 
made for the renewal of the party’s organisation was the introduction of direct 
elections for the main party bodies, while the incumbent leader’s motion 
called for the introduction of party primaries only for party leaders at the 
regional level (distrital). As it became clear that the majority of the party elite 
supported Rebelo de Sousa’s leadership campaign, Santana Lopes decided to 
withdraw, opening the way for the approval of party changes by adopting an 
OMOV system for the selection of leaders at the regional level.
Santana Lopes again proposed democratising reforms during the 23rd 
congress (2000). Yet, according to an opinion poll of party delegates, the 
majority of the party’s elite did not support this expansion of members’ rights 
(Expresso 26 February 2000). The approval of the organisational changes 
proposed by Santana Lopes would have eventually suspended the congress 
in order to introduce the new mechanism for party leadership selection. This 
was in fact a sign of the deep politicisation of the every-member voting mech-
anism, opposing Durão Barroso to his main challenger, Santana Lopes. The 
incumbent leader gained the proposal of party changes and was re-elected 
party leader. However, an increasing proportion of the party elite considered 
the introduction of direct leadership elections inevitable in the mid-term, 
which softened Santana Lopes’s defeat.
The debate over the introduction of democratic reform through party leader-
ship selection re-emerged after Santana Lopes’s resignation in the wake of the 
2005 legislative elections, which led to the election of a new party leader – Luís 
Marques Mendes – at the 27th congress (2005). Mendes decided to convene 
a party convention in order to approve the change to the statutes, namely 
the direct leadership election and the payment of party membership fees as 
a prerequisite for obtaining the right to vote. This proposal was to raise some 
tensions among local party leaders – particularly in the Oporto district – and it 
was openly opposed by the Social Democratic Youth (JSD – Juventude Social 
Democrata). 
Some leaders proposed further enhancing internal democratisation by 
introducing party primaries for candidate selection and for all public office 
holders at both national and local level. As noted above, Menezes and Santana 
Lopes were two of the strongest supporters for this organisational change. 
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for non-members to 
join and participate in 
the leadership contest.
Several proposals for changes to the party constitution were advanced, each 
differing with regard to which positions should be subject to such primaries.
The organisational reform approved in 2006 (at the 28th congress) had 
three main objectives: the first was to open and to democratise party organi-
sation, the second was to make the party leadership more responsible while 
the third was intended to increase internal participation and mobilisation. The 
motion proposed by Marques Mendes also included the creation of a new party 
organ formed by experts and specialists who could offer advice to the party 
leader. This proposal sought to increase the leader’s resources by creating a staff 
that would elaborate specific policies and to define party strategy. It was also a 
means to overcome internal opposition, especially from those who were against 
the introduction of premier primaries, as was the case with most of Durão 
Barroso’s followers, for example. However, in the end only 20 per cent of party 
delegates opposed Marques Mendes’s proposals for organisational changes, 
and the new leader was elected by an overwhelming majority (Table 3).
Despite the positive results obtained by the PSD at local and presidential 
elections, Mendes’ leadership experienced huge domestic and external diffi-
culties, as an environment of deep criticism emerged within the PSD follow-
ing its defeat in 2007 to Lisbon council. Due to the poor performance of the 
PSD’s candidate, Mendes decided to resign and to call for a new leadership 
election. This was the chance Menezes had been waiting for since 2005 to 
challenge the leadership using the OMOV system.
The campaign for the 2007 primaries was characterised by conflicts on 
rules about who had the right to vote, serving to deepen the tensions between 
the two candidates. Menezes argued that party members could pay their fees 
right up until the election day, while the incumbent leader stated that only 
those members who had already paid their membership fees should be enti-
tled to vote.7 
Both leaders were deeply concerned about the support they could gather 
at the local level. While Mendes benefited from the support of most local party 
leaders and structures, Menezes sought to enhance his position among public 
office holders. In this sense, although the internal struggle – thanks to the 
media – had a large impact on public opinion, the party campaign tended to 
take place more at the local level than at the national. The national party elite 
stood aside from the conflict, and many well-known figures refused to take 
a position publicly in favour of one or other candidate – the clearest example 
being Manuela Ferreira Leite, a minister in Durão Barroso’s government.
Following his election to the position of party leader (with 54 per cent 
of the vote), Menezes failed completely to implement the renewal of the 
party programme and enhance the role of the PSD as the main opposition. 
According to opinion surveys, there was still a wide gap between the PSD 
and the PS, while the new leader was not able to improve his popularity and 
consolidate his leadership within the party. Internal criticism rose steadily and 
led Menezes to resign. 
The field of leadership candidates to replace Menezes was eventually whit-
tled down to three. The first serious candidate was Pedro Passos Coelho, a 
former leader of the JSD, who called for the PSD to adopt a more liberal posi-
tion. Santana Lopes, who tried to use his populism to appeal to activists with-
out actually outlining a programme, also threw his hat into the ring. The final 
serious candidate was Manuela Ferreira Leite, one of the most popular minis-
ters in Durão Barroso’s government, whose candidacy sought to combine the 
institutional image she constructed while in office (based on her credibility 
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 8. A survey conducted 
two weeks before the 
elections gave Ferreira 
Leite 64 per cent of the 
vote (Correio da Manhã 
17 May 2008).
following her implementation of fiscal containment measures when in office) 
with a defence of social policies.
 Although the turnout remained at the same level as the previous election, 
the absolute number of voters increased significantly as a result of the regis-
tration of new voters. The competition between the candidates encouraged 
the participation of new (and old) party members. Ferreira Leite was elected 
with 37.9 per cent of the vote, with Passos Coelho obtaining 30 per cent. This 
victory was closer than had been suggested by the opinion polls that had 
given Ferreira Leite a clear lead.8 The closeness of the result highlighted the 
deep divisions that existed within the party, as can be seen by the composition 
of the main party bodies elected during the 31st congress – split between the 
three candidates – and by the choice of the new parliamentary leader, elected 
just by a thin majority (54 per cent).    
It is worth noting that while the participation rate was lower than in previ-
ous elections, the number of voters substantially increased, mainly due to 
the difficulties in maintaining an accurate membership list. This was also the 
consequence of the high level of competitiveness in this contest. However, 
Leader Year Number 
of voters
Turnout Votes
(%)
Voters as 
percent-
age of 
support-
ers in 
previous 
election
Competi-
tion
Institutional 
status
CDS-PP
Ribeiro e 
Castro
2005  5037 14.3 93.7 1.21 No Opposition
Paulo Portas 2007  7531 21.9 74.6 1.81 Yes Opposition
Paulo Portas 2008  6358 31.4 95.1 1.53 No Opposition
Average -  6308 22.5 87.8 1.52 - -
PSD
Marques 
Mendes
2006  20,649 37.2 90.9 1.26 No Opposition
Luís Filipe 
Menezes
2007  20,701 60.7 54.1 1.26 Yes Opposition
Manuela 
Ferreira Leite
2008  45,444 58.9 37.9 2.77 Yes Opposition
Pedro Passos 
Coelho
2010  51,737 66.2 61.2 3.12 Yes Opposition
Average -  34,632 55.7 61.0 2.10 - -
Source: Party headquarters.
Table 3: The election of leaders in right parties.
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the success of the new party leader was inevitably linked to electoral perform-
ance during 2009. Despite relatively favourable conditions, Ferreira Leite was 
unable to improve the party’s performance in the legislative and local elec-
tions held during September and October, respectively. She also had diffi-
culty managing her relationship with the media and was unable to increase 
her popularity, while her proposals were not fully supported by her party. 
Following the election defeats of 2009, several party leaders called for her to 
resign. Passos Coelho was the first to declare that he would stand for the 
party’s leadership.
Some party leaders publicly criticised the method of choosing party lead-
ers when it became clear that a new election would soon take place. Santana 
Lopes’ was the main voice of dissent, and he called for an extraordinary party 
congress to be held to debate the rules. He claimed that the reforms had 
been bad for the party and that the traditional representative mode of selec-
tion allowed party activists to discuss and energise the party platform, which 
would have positive effects in terms of participation and internal cohesion.
His proposal divided the party elite, particularly with regard to the timing 
of the leadership election. According to Santana Lopes, the election should 
have taken place only after the debate on the rules governing the election. 
However, Passos Coelho argued that the election should take place before 
the debate. The national party’s decision-making bodies accepted Santana 
Lopes’s proposal and postponed the election until after the extraordinary 
congress. This decision gave other people time to declare their intention to 
stand. Paulo Rangel, a former leader of the parliamentary group, stepped up, 
as did José Pedro Aguiar-Branco, who had replaced Rangel as leader of the 
PSD’s parliamentary group.9 The majority of party delegates rejected Santana 
Lopes’ proposal in the 2010 congress, but the results showed the division 
within the party on this issue (244 votes against, 241 in favour and 92 absten-
tions). This decision paved the way for the election of Passos Coelho, who 
won more than 61 per cent of the vote to become the new leader of the PSD. 
Democratic and Social Centre-People’s Party (CDS-PP)
The elite of the CDS-PP have always given little consideration to organisa-
tional matters within the party, and organisational reforms have mostly been 
used as an instrument to demonstrate the renewal of the party leadership or 
as a sign of intra-party democracy in order to appeal to voters. It is interest-
ing to note that the debate about the selection of party leadership in the party 
suddenly moved from a proposal aiming to reduce the inclusiveness of lead-
ers’ selection to the introduction of direct election by party members. 
In fact, during the 17th congress (2000) the incumbent – Paulo Portas – 
suggested the creation of a senate, composed largely of leading figures within 
the party, to be responsible for choosing the party’s leader (Expresso 11 March 
2000). Thus, unlike with the PSD, the CDS suggested restricting the elector-
ate, and criticised the populism embraced by the two major parties. However, 
the proposal did not receive the support of the majority of the party elite, and 
the leader continued to be elected by party delegates.
The debate about how the party leader should be elected emerged again 
after defeat in the 2005 legislative elections. When Portas resigned, the strug-
gle for a new party leader resulted in Telmo Correia, a Portas supporter, facing 
José Ribeiro e Castro, a member of the European Parliament, who was able 
to gather a significant amount of support from critics of Portas’s leadership. 
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 10. It is worth noting that 
direct election was 
not introduced into 
the party’s statutes: it 
was considered to be a 
temporary measure.
 11. See also the motion Um 
partido com soluções, 
prepared for the 23rd 
congress of January 
2009.
Surprisingly, 55 per cent of the party’s delegates chose Ribeiro e Castro to lead 
them. However, even after his election at the party congress, Ribeiro e Castro 
was unable to overcome the divisions within the party.
One of his first actions was to introduce direct leadership elections. The 
opposition within the party elite argued against this proposal, defending 
the collective decision-making processes. Ribeiro e Castro had to approve a 
temporary change to the party’s statutes that did not allow for the direct elec-
tion of the party leader. According to the CDS-PP constitution, congress is 
the body responsible for all changes, so only congress could introduce every-
member voting. 
As with the PSD, the reform of selection methods was linked to the chal-
lenges the leadership had to face. In particular, internal fragmentation and 
divisions within the party elite were major concerns for the new leadership. In 
this sense, the democratisation of the party leadership selection process was 
seen as a means to overcome internal party conflicts and consolidate the new 
leadership. 
The first time the CDS-PP’s leader was elected by the party’s members 
was in May 2005, and the only candidate was Ribeiro e Castro.10 This organi-
sational change sought to legitimise the new leader, thus strengthening the 
party’s internal cohesion and limiting internal conflicts. It was also intended 
to mobilise the party membership in preparation for the local elections of 
October 2005. However, this change did not bring any benefit to the party in 
the short term, as the lack of internal competition for the leadership failed to 
attract new voters, while the party’s supporters did not consider intra-party 
democracy to be a priority.
The second act took place in 2007 when Paulo Portas decided to challenge 
the party leader for the leadership. This time Ribeiro e Castro opposed the 
decision to choose the party leader through the OMOV mechanism, claim-
ing a lack of respect for procedural rules. The problems around formal aspects 
were to result in legal challenges that involved all of the party’s main institu-
tions. After an internal struggle between the two opposing factions, which was 
echoed in public opinion, the party’s national council approve the holding of 
an election for the leadership of the party, which Portas won with more than 
74 per cent of the vote. Ribeiro e Castro criticised the way Portas had won.   
Portas did not represent a clear change in party leadership. His commit-
ment was to enhance the CDS-PP’s appeal by reshaping the policy agenda. 
His main goal was to elaborate a new programme that was based on both 
traditional law and order policies and on such ‘new politics’ as the environ-
ment, social responsibility and quality of life. The defence of social policies 
was another priority for the new leadership, which it hoped to achieve by 
combining improvements in working conditions with protection of family.11 
However, this policy renewal did not clearly emerge during the 2009 elec-
tions, while the leadership’s popularity has remained closely linked to the 
performance of the main centre-right party. 
Portas decided to anticipate both the election and the congress in order 
to avoid the emergence of an internal opposition candidate and to strengthen 
party cohesion for the series of elections in 2009. In December 2008 he was 
re-elected with 95.1 per cent of the votes. Although the turnout was higher 
than in the previous primary (31.4 per cent) – due to the clean-up of the 
party’s membership list, which has substantially reduced the number of 
members eligible to vote – the absolute number of voters indicates that the 
party’s grassroots are demobilising. Moreover, the weak institutionalisation 
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of the direct leadership election process was reflected in the proposal by the 
party’s youth section (Juventude Popular) during the 23rd congress in January 
2009 to reintroduce the old-style party convention.
THE EFFECTS OF DIRECT LEADERSHIP SELECTION: LESSONS FROM 
THE PORTUGUESE EXPERIENCE
When dealing with the effects of the introduction of direct leadership selec-
tion we need to consider both internal and external consequences. The first 
dimension focuses on the increase in party membership and internal partici-
pation and the internal distribution of power; the second aspect centres on the 
leadership’s ideological orientation and the personalisation of party politics. 
Several authors have stressed that the introduction of party primaries 
should enhance both party membership and internal participation (Carty 
and Blake 1999; Pennings and Hazan 2001). Although in the Portuguese case 
there are virtually no data on party activism, and figures on party membership 
and internal participation are highly unreliable, the evidence from participa-
tion in the election of party leaders shows that the level of mobilisation varies 
greatly, ranging from 15 to 65 per cent. 
On average, the PSD displays the highest rate of participation (55.7 per 
cent), while members of the CDS-PP are less likely to participate (22.5 per 
cent). The PS falls between these two (39 per cent). These figures are not 
significantly different from data on internal participation before the reform of 
leadership selection methods.12 Overall, the Portuguese experience shows that 
only a small fraction of the parties’ supporters actually participates in these 
contests.
The main difficulty in assessing patterns of variation with regard to internal 
participation in leadership elections stems from the unreliability of member-
ship figures provided by the parties. One of the main consequences of direct 
leadership selection is that the parties’ estimates of their own membership 
have become more accurate because the reform has compelled the party elites 
to define the status of each member and to maintain more rigorous control of 
membership data. In particular, frequent and competitive leadership elections 
imply tight control of membership figures, but when party membership is not 
updated, turnout figures are likely to be inflated and it becomes difficult to 
make comparison across parties. Despite this, important differences between 
parties still exist, and this is a problem that must be addressed beyond the bias 
and imperfection of membership figures. 
Participation in leadership selection may depend on several factors, includ-
ing the different territorial traditions of political participation, the party’s 
electoral strength, the level of competitiveness between parties, and the socio-
demographic characteristics of the party’s supporters. At the aggregate level, 
we observe a relative strong association between the competitiveness of the 
contests and the level of internal participation.13 The experience of the PS – the 
one with a longer tradition as far as direct leadership elections are concerned – 
shows that competitive races are more likely to mobilise a greater number of 
party members, while ‘coronations’ are generally associated with demobilisa-
tion dynamics. Despite the high level of member participation in the first two 
elections, it must be noted that in 2004 – after the membership files had been 
updated – competition between three candidates raised the level of turnout 
(see Table 2). In this case every-member voting and leadership competition 
stimulated political participation, increasing party member mobilisation. 
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However, the experience of the parties of the right suggests that when 
competition is just a struggle between top leaders, the effect on party mobilisa-
tion is the opposite, since a strong competition is associated with low participa-
tion. While in the case of the PS there is a positive relationship between the level 
of competition and turnout rates, for both the right-wing parties the relationship 
is stronger and, most strikingly, it is negative.14 This means that high turnout 
rates are associated with a wider gap between the two main contenders. 
For example, in the 2007 CDS-PP elections, Portas’s ability to mobilise his 
supporters increased the overall level of participation, while the local party 
sections where the challenger obtained his best scores were characterised by 
low turnout rates. The PSD shows the same pattern in respect of the 2008 and 
2010 elections. Despite the higher rate of turnout compared to the CDS-PP, 
it is remarkable that the slope is almost the same (Figure 1). For both parties 
of the right, this preliminary analysis seems to suggest turnout depends to a 
great extent on the ability of the candidate to mobilise and generate support at 
the local level, rather than on the degree of competitiveness.
The second dimension considers the impact of direct leadership elections 
on the internal distribution of power. In both the PSD and the CDS-PP, the 
access of members to party organisation often takes place through clientelis-
tic practices, particularly where party notables are able to control local struc-
tures and the recruitment of new members (Jalali 2007). While national party 
bodies usually disregard party organisation and members, local bosses can 
easily manipulate local party organs and the access members enjoy. In this 
sense, the introduction of direct leadership elections may lead to significant 
changes in the internal distribution of power, as it may enhance the centrali-
sation and the concentration of power in the national party elite and reduce 
the importance of territorial cleavages (Corkill 1995). 
As has been shown, the introduction of party primaries has triggered many 
conflicts within the party leadership in regard to the rules regulating the elec-
torate. As the main Portuguese parties (especially the PSD) have been char-
acterised by a high level of ‘stratarchy’15 that bestows significant autonomy 
upon the local level (Jalali 2006), the introduction of OMOV may change the 
internal distribution of power, as party leaders can control directly members’ 
participation. 
In this respect, while for the PS the reform has enhanced the degree of 
centralisation without substantially altering the internal distribution of power 
(Lisi 2006: 390), the evidence from the PSD experience thus far has been 
mixed: Menezes’s election seemed to show that local leaders have retained 
significant powers. However, several observers have suggested that in the 
2008 elections, the role played by local leaders decreased, and that their influ-
ence on the selection of the party leader dwindled due to a lack of correspond-
ence between the support of local leaders for each of the three candidates and 
the final result.
The third aspect worth highlighting relates to the ideological dimen-
sion. Have parties become more responsive towards members or their elec-
toral bases? Several authors have argued that different selectorates imply 
the selection of different candidates in terms of policy orientation, and that 
democratising reforms are also an instrument for bypassing the parliamentary 
party’s lack of representativeness (Carty and Blake 1999; LeDuc 2001; Cross 
and Crysler 2009). According to this hypothesis, party leaders should present 
moderate stances in order to appeal to the average voter, rather than reflect-
ing members’ preferences. Thus, by entitling party members to select the party 
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leader it is easier to neutralise party activists and increase the responsiveness 
of parties towards the average voter. 
Although this hypothesis may find some support in the experience of the 
British Labour Party (Hopkin 2001), it is hard to apply it to parties in southern 
Europe and, in particular, to Portuguese parties. In the PS, the front-runner has 
always displayed a moderate orientation that was overwhelmingly supported 
by both the party elite and its members. The PS favours a centrist strategy, and 
Leader Participation Competitiveness
Mean
(%)
Std. 
dev.
Min-Max
(%)
Mean
(%)
Std. dev. Min-Max
(%)
(N)
CDS-PP
Ribeiro e Castro 14.3 9.14  4.0–39.0 – – – (20)
Paulo Portas 21.9 15.0  3.8–85.1 54.2 26.6 0–100 (151)
Paulo Portas 31.4 13.7 12.7–68.0 – – – (20)
PSD
Manuela Ferreira Leite 58.9 15.5  3.45–100 32.1 24.6 0–100 (328)
Pedro Passos Coelho 66.2 15.5  3.85–100 44.3 28.2 0–100 (329)
Source: Party headquarters.
Table 4: Participation and competition in right parties.
Source: Party headquarters.
Note: CDS-PP (N=151); PSD 2008 (N=328); PSD 2010 (N=329).
Figure 1: Turnout and competitiveness for leader elections of right parties.
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left-wing candidates have always run as outsiders. Similarly, both the lead-
ers of the PSD and the CDS-PP have shown a great congruence with their 
respective electoral bases, and no deep programmatic or ideological changes 
have taken place since the introduction of the direct election of party leaders.
The fourth aspect focuses on the diminishing role of political parties and 
the strengthening of candidate- and premier-centred politics. One of the 
consequences emphasised by political observers is that the adoption of party 
primaries will increase the personalisation of political parties (Seyd 1999; 
Young and Cross 2002). 
Have democratising reforms weakened party organisations to the detri-
ment of leaders, thus enhancing the personalisation of politics? To what 
extent will these reforms lead to the importation of some characteristics of 
American-style primaries in the Portuguese case? 
Since the 2004 election of the PS leader, internal party campaigns have 
attracted widespread attention from the mass media and have been organised 
as electoral campaigns with a campaign staff and external consultants, raising 
the costs normally associated with internal elections.16 
In many cases, the election of party leaders – as well as party conventions – 
has become simply the ‘coronation’ of party leaders, while the traditional 
party meetings have to a large extent lost their drama and their importance in 
terms of deliberative gatherings. This fact suggests that the direct election of 
party leaders aims essentially at improving the image of the parties through 
media coverage. Thus, the mass media has played a fundamental role by 
contributing both to informing party members and to influencing voters 
and public opinion. This phenomenon also has an important impact on the 
functions developed by party organisations and local structures. As the link 
between party leaders and members is now mediatised – rather than medi-
ated by party structures – leaders are directly accountable to party sympathis-
ers, further ‘hollowing-out’ the traditional functions developed through party 
organisation.
CONCLUSIONS
The introduction of direct leadership selection represents one of the major 
organisational changes of Portuguese parties during the last decade. 
What are the main forces that have led to this transformation? Overall, 
the three cases analysed in this study show that leadership selection reform 
is closely linked to internal party struggles and to pressures from the party 
system. Rather than leading to a radical change through the empowerment 
of party members, the democratisation of leadership selection is essentially a 
function of the strategic calculus of the party elite. In the case of the PS, this 
reform mainly had internal roots and was the effect of a process of elite nego-
tiation with regard to the change of the overall party organisational structure. 
However, both the PSD and the CDS-PP have used direct elections in a period 
of leadership transition while they were in opposition, aiming to strengthen 
the legitimacy of the party leaders and improve the party’s popularity. 
Both right-wing parties decided to implement an organisational change 
after the 2005 election defeat that stimulated internal rivalries and resulted 
in high leadership turnover. In this sense, the struggle for party leadership 
seems to be the most important factor in favouring the adoption of direct 
election, confirming Panebianco’s hypothesis that democratising reforms are 
essentially a ‘Trojan horse’ for enforcing a change of the dominant coalition. 
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At the same time, this change seeks to increase support among voters and to 
increase electoral gains. The importance of isomorphic processes, that is, the 
‘contagion effect’ the socialist experience has projected on the parties of the 
right – especially after the 2004 elections – should also be noted.
This finding is also supported by similar experiences across Europe, for 
example, in Spain and Italy. First, the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE – Partido 
Socialista Obrero Español)  decided to introduce the selection of the candidate 
for prime minister by party members in 1998 after the PP’s victory two years 
earlier, while in Italy the centre-left parties decided to implement the selection 
of the coalition leader by party sympathisers in 2005, just months before the 
legislative elections. Second, in both cases the introduction of party primaries 
was an important asset to exploit both in the electoral arena, where it can be 
used to appeal to new supporters, and within the party organisation, where it 
can be used to defeat the internal opposition and enhance the legitimisation 
of the new leadership. The cases of PSOE, the Italian Democratic Left (DS – 
Democratici di Sinistra) or PASOK in Greece confirm that the introduction of 
every-member voting essentially seeks to strengthen the electoral appeal of 
the party both internally and externally.
Beyond this common aspect, it is worth noting there are important differ-
ences between parties, especially with regard to levels of participation and 
competitiveness. These two dimensions are closely related, and this relation-
ship emerges clearly for leadership elections in the PSD. However, the higher 
turnout rate of this party seems to be due also to the importance of local poli-
tics in mobilising party members. On the other hand, the extremely low levels 
of participation within the CDS-PP mirror its weak social roots and the diffi-
culty it has in establishing organisational structures within civil society. Thus, in 
order to explain this variance it is also essential to take into account the legacy 
of party organisations, namely their ‘genetic’ model and its development.
Differences across parties also emerge in terms of competitiveness. In this 
case, it seems the main distinction is between incumbent parties and opposi-
tion parties. During the last decade the PS has been the main governing party 
in Portugal, with the exception of the brief right-wing coalition government 
between 2002 and 2004. This is also the party with the lowest level of compet-
itiveness. The only exception concerns Ferro Rodrigues’s leadership, which 
can be explained by the electoral and political context in which it took place. 
In the remaining cases, parties in opposition have always displayed a higher 
level of competitiveness. 
There are, of course, other factors that contribute towards an explanation 
for the differences across parties. In particular, the traditionally high factional-
ism of the PSD and the importance of (potential) conflicts between the centre 
and periphery are also important elements accounting for the higher levels of 
competition within the party elite as opposed to both the PS and the CDS-PP.
Overall, the Portuguese experience suggests that this reform has not had 
a significant impact on party politics. The main governing parties have not 
used leadership campaigns to attract new members, and there has been little 
mobilisation of supporters during these contexts. Moreover, the strategic use 
of democratisation reform has been accompanied by a lack of internal debate 
among party members and by limited consequences for members’ powers 
and internal participation. Without any real effect on the internal functioning 
of the parties, political leaders have thus found it an easy way to increase their 
power, while feeding the participatory and democratic myth. 
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Although party leaders may strengthen their positions vis-à-vis party 
activists by reducing the decision-making capacity of collective party bodies, 
it is worth remembering that this is not a new trend in Portuguese parties, 
and that party organisations may still have important roles. As demonstrated 
by the PSD experience, local politics, membership dynamics and conflicts on 
internal rules are important elements that may limit the action of party lead-
ers. In other words, it seems implausible that these reforms could lead, as in 
the United States, to a weakening of the role played by party organisations 
and to a reduction of political parties to ‘empty vessels’ (Katz 1990). 
Party politics in Portugal – and more generally in Western Europe – is 
still well entrenched, and no internal reforms will change this in the foresee-
able future, unless radical changes take place. Thus, contrary to the findings of 
LeDuc (2001) regarding the effects of the democratisation of party leadership 
selection in Britain, Canada and the United States, the Portuguese experience 
suggests that these reforms may not imply – at least in the short term – any 
loss of party control over the election of leaderships and, more generally, the 
irrelevance of party organisations.
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